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Between the Species
What the Wild Things are:
A Critique on Clare Palmer’s
“What (If Anything) Do We
Owe Animals?”
ABSTRACT
In this critique of Clare Palmer’s “What (if anything) do we owe wild
animals?”, I develop three points. First, I consider the case study
which opens her essay and argue that that there are good empirical
reasons to think that we should assist domesticated horses and not
wild deer. Then, I critique Palmer’s claim that “wildness is not a
capacity,” arguing that wildness connotes certain capacities which
wild animals generally have and which domesticated animals generally lack. Lastly, I develop what I call the “supererogation problem”
against Palmer’s preferred contextualist view, claiming that while the
contextualist view doesn’t obligate us to eliminate predators and otherwise redesign nature in the name of wild animal welfare, it may
nonetheless allow such interventions. This suggests that the problem
with both utilitarian and contextualist views arises from their shared
theory of value and not their theory of obligation.
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The issues Clare Palmer addresses in “What (if Anything)
Do We Owe Wild Animals?” are timely and important. Since
its inception in the 1970’s, animal ethics has been primarily
concerned with our treatment of domesticated animals, particularly in agriculture, research, and entertainment. By contrast,
the moral issues concerning wild animals have been treated
largely as secondary, and such treatments are often inadequate.
For example, in Animal Liberation (1975), the first seminal text
in the contemporary animal ethics canon, Peter Singer dedicates a chapter to animal agriculture and another to animal research, yet discussion of the implications of his view for wild
animals is dealt with in passing. However, wild animals outnumber domesticated animals by many orders of magnitude.
Furthermore, life in the wild is “red in tooth and claw” (Tennyson 1849), and is some combination of “nasty, brutish, and
short” for the majority of animals (Hobbes 2008, 86). So, the
issues Palmer raises in her paper and book, Animal Ethics in
Context, are important ones and address a gap in animal ethics
scholarship. Palmer’s Contextual (or Relational) View is similar in spirit to Mary Midgley’s view in Animals and Why They
Matter in that obligations towards animals depend on our relationship with them (Midgley 1983). However, Palmer’s view
is novel because it focuses on giving an account of why our
obligations to domesticated animals should differ from our obligations to wild animals.
As this piece is a commentary on Palmer’s paper, I take for
granted familiarity with that work—see above in this volume
of Between the Species—and will move straight to my critical
comments, of which I will raise three. First, I offer a critique of
the case raised by Palmer, which is that the facts of such a case,
not relations or context, explain why our judgments about the
case differ. I then raise a second, related point which critiques
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Palmer’s claim that wildness is not a capacity. Third, I raise
a potential problem for Palmer’s contextual view, the gist of
which is that it faces a problem quite similar to the demandingness problem which she levies against utilitarianism.

1. Horses, Deer, and Coyotes: The Devil’s in the
Details
Palmer opens her discussion by asking us to consider a case
involving horses and deer. In the case, you are hiking on a cold
day in the middle of a hard winter. In a farmer’s field, you see a
couple of horses without shelter, potable water, or food. In the
same field, you also see some deer—a doe and a fawn—which
also lack shelter, food, and water. Should you help the horses,
and if so, does this mean that you should also help the deer?
Note that I’ve left out the coyote, as this introduces further
complexities such as competing animals’ interests.
Palmer has it right in my case; I think that I probably should
help the horses, but probably should not help the deer. The question is what explains why we—or at least I—think this way, and
whether we should think this way. All case studies are, to varying degrees, incomplete. I think part of the explanation for why
we think this way is because we fill in the gaps of cases such as
this, and this merits some critical discussion.
Later in the paper, Palmer adds some relevant facts to the
case. Domesticated horses are “more vulnerable to the cold
than wild horses (they have thinner, sleeker coats). They have
been confined by fences in a field, making it impossible for
them to independently seek shelter or food elsewhere.” So,
these horses are without food, water, and shelter, and are incapable of doing anything about it. Now, do we imagine that the
farmer has sequestered and confined the deer? I don’t suspect
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that we do. However, if the farmer is holding the deer captive
and depriving them of food, water, and shelter, I think that we
ought to intervene for the very same reasons as for the horses.
I do not see any morally relevant difference between the horses
and deer if this were the case.
But I don’t suspect that’s how we imagine the deer case. The
deer are there because, in some sense, they want to be. Several
questions come to mind about the case. Why aren’t they doing
anything to better their situation? Why don’t they wander down
to a stream for a drink if they are thirsty? Why did they leave
their deeryards—wooded areas of softwood species where deer
pass the winter, and which provide protection from wind, forage
to browse on, a system of trails to monitor and evade predators,
and which are typically south-facing for sun exposure—and
enter this field exposed to the elements? It is also relevant that,
unlike horses, whitetail deer are, shall we say, better “dressed”
for winter weather. They are so well insulated by thick winter
coats and subcutaneous fat that snow can accumulate on their
fur without melting. They don’t eat much in the winter either.
About half of their winter caloric intake comes from fat stores.
So, there are good empirical reasons which help explain why
our intuitions differ between the horse and deer cases. Deer
are generally free to get on with the business of living and are
better equipped to pass the winter, whereas the horses are sequestered in a field and less well equipped to pass the winter.
It bears mentioning that the moral issues raised by the case
are not purely fictional. Feeding deer is an increasingly common practice in many areas, by both individuals and institutions. Some businesses now do it as a way to attract customers.
Feeding deer in the winter creates many problems for them.
It draws deer out of deeryards and into what Palmer calls the
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“contact zone” between fully wild and domesticated spaces.
This has several negative consequences. It results in more deertraffic accidents, predators are drawn to the unnaturally high
concentrations of deer in the area (devoured carcasses are often
found near feeding sites), and can facilitate the spread of disease.
In fact, some biologists argue on welfarist grounds that we
shouldn’t feed deer at all. Kent Gustafson, deer project leader
for New Hampshire Fish and Game says that “quality natural
habitat provides the best insurance for deer survival in winter.
If you care about deer, leave them alone—let them be wild, and
find natural foods and appropriate winter shelter on their own”
(Gustafson and Vachon 2010). Furthermore, deer receive little
nutritional value from new food for approximately two weeks
after feeding because, as ruminants, their intestinal fauna have
to adjust to the change in diet. Commenting on this, Gustafson
adds that “ironically, while well-intentioned people try to help
the deer by feeding, they may be harming them due to the time
and energy needed to convert the microorganisms” (Gustafson
and Vachon 2010). So even Palmer’s conservative claim, that
“we can at least expect that nourishing food at this point will reduce their total winter suffering,” may turn out not to be untrue.
Don’t get me wrong, I am sympathetic with the drive to assist
those in need, human and nonhuman, when doing so is actually
beneficial. I am not suggesting that we should never intervene
in the lives of wild animals out of concern for their lives, welfare, or rights. My point is that oftentimes what we think will
help only makes things worse. For example, well-intentioned
people “save” what they see as poor abandoned fawns every
spring and take them to veterinary hospitals and the like. These
animals are fostered by wildlife rehabilitators at great cost in
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terms of time, effort, and money, and then reintroduced into the
wild after a year or two. The problem is that does often leave
fawns hidden in the spring. What these would-be rescuers have
done is separate mother and child. A knee-jerk sentimentalism
and a biologically informed welfarist ethic have different rather
practical implications.
It seems, then, that there are straightforward empirical reasons to think that what Palmer calls “the Capacity-Oriented,
Consequentialist View,” i.e. utilitarianism, can account for
the intuition that neglected domesticated horses and wild deer
merit different actions on our part. I appreciated it when Colin
Allen said (referring to Quintelier et al. 2011) that “normative
ethics does not need a foundation: it needs more science” in
his earlier talk “Ethics, Law, and the Science of Fish Welfare”
at the March 2012 Animals, Ethics, & Law Symposium at the
University of Tennessee. Biology matters. This is at surely true,
to a point. However, I doubt all cases are resolvable simply by
introducing more facts. I’m not prepared to give up ethics just
yet, and I don’t suspect Palmer is either.

2. Wildness as Capacity
I’ll move on to my second point, which builds on the first.
Palmer says that, for consequentialism, “the distinction between ‘wild’ and ‘domesticated’ is of no moral interest.” Why
not? She answers that “Wildness is not a capacity,” but doesn’t
defend this assessment. Recall that by “wild animals,” we mean
this in the sense that animals have not been domesticated, which
Palmer calls constitutively wild animals. In Animal Ethics in
Context she understands “domesticated” in terms of the presence of a certain kind of relationship with humans, and “wild”
as the absence of this relationship with humans (Palmer 2010,
7-8; 63-65). The relationships that domesticated animals have
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with humans makes them vulnerable and dependent on us, and
the creation of these vulnerabilities and dependencies generates
positive obligations towards them, obligations which are absent
in the case of wild animals.
I don’t see the contextual backstory or relationship as being
necessary to explain the vulnerability and dependency of domesticated animals, or at least not in a way that is not also open
to appeal by consequentialists.
The idea that wildness is not a capacity strikes me as very
curious. It makes perfectly good sense to say that “wildness”
conveys certain capacities, capacities which domesticated animals lack. The above discussion of the differences between
domesticated horses and wild deer implicitly suggested that
these animals have rather different capacities. More generally,
wild animals have many biological and behavioral adaptations
suited to their particular forms of life in their particular environments. While not always realized, these adaptations aim at
survival and reproduction independent from humans. Similarly,
the vulnerabilities and dependencies created by domestication
can be understood as the absence of such a capacity for self-sufficiency. Their bodies and their behavior have been redirected,
to greater and lesser extents, towards our ends and away from
the ends of survival and reproduction in their original ecological niches. Domesticated animals generally lack the capacity of
going it alone, and wild animals generally possess this capacity.
Now on a strict utilitarian view, wildness as such isn’t morally significant, but it does get at the fact that, because wild
animals are better able to procure their welfare on their own
than are the more vulnerable and dependent domesticated animals, there is less reason for intervention on moral grounds.
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This goes some distance, if not all the way, towards explaining
our different intuitions about cases involving wild and domesticated animals. The claim that we need a relational account of
obligation to account for different obligations towards wild and
domesticated animals is undercut if wildness is a capacity.

3. The Supererogation Problem
Now let’s wade out into deeper philosophical waters. One
of the objections Palmer raises about the capacity-oriented,
consequentialist view is that it demands too much. This stock
objection to utilitarianism is that the deontic principle of utilitarianism—the value-maximizing greatest happiness principle,
which asks us to act so as to realize the greatest good for the
greatest number—simply asks more of us than a moral theory should ask of us. Palmer argues that this principle of value
maximization, combined with the capacity-orientation—the
view that the only morally valuable capacity which animals
have is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain—entail or
suggest that we have the same obligations to the horse as to the
deer. However, Palmer’s concern is that this makes our obligations overly burdensome since there are so many deer out there
in need of assistance.
Note that this concern arises not just for single cases such as
the deer, but broader issues as well, such as eliminating predator species and perhaps any species the members of which
have a negative net welfare or which contribute negatively to
the welfare of others, on balance. After all, it isn’t just predators that seem to depress the hedonic economy. Parasites and
diseases do as well. Perhaps what utilitarianism requires is the
elimination of all wild animals and their replacement with domesticated ones, realizing a pastoral ideal where “the wolf will
live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat”
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(Isaiah 11:6). If utilitarianism really does entail and not merely
suggest that we have such obligations, then it is at best counterintuitive and at worst untenable. There is a rich tradition of
debate on the supposed demandingness and its import in the
literature about utilitarianism more generally, and so I’ll leave
the general point aside.
However, it’s not clear that, if utilitarianism really is so demanding with respect to wild animal assistance, that the contextual view is superior, for it faces a similar problem. The
worry is that, whereas utilitarianism demands too much of us if
it requires us to police nature, this contextual view allows too
much if it allows us to police nature. I’ll call this the supererogation problem.
I should first show how the contextual view is open to this
supererogation problem. Palmer says that “many people would
think that… they would have no moral requirement to [assist]
the deer, nor protect the fawn from the coyote.” Elsewhere, she
adds that “the contextual view doesn’t maintain that assisting
wild animals would necessary be wrong; rather, it just claims
that we don’t normally have special obligations to assist…” In
contrast, we have no obligations to assist on the contextual view
because we are not in a relationship with wild animals, and it
is relationships which ground such positive obligations. Later,
Palmer adds that a “contextual view wouldn’t forbid [reducing
the amount of suffering in nature or shaping nature differently]
but it does not follow from the view…” So, while it is not entailed by the contextual view that one must reduce suffering
and reshape nature, one may. In short, “fixing” nature would be
permissible on the contextual view. Furthermore, if we undergird the contextual view of obligation with a hedonistic view
of value, then it certainly appears to not merely be permissible
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to reengineer nature, but supererogatory to do so insofar as it
increases the balance of pleasure over pain.
Palmer adds that on the contextualist view “there would be
no reason to aim to reduce the amount of suffering in nature by
managing or shaping it differently, assuming we could do so
successfully.” Why would there be no reason to aim to reduce
the amount of suffering? In her paper, Palmer argues that some
animals have moral status, meaning that many nonhuman animals have an experiential welfare, and draws attention to the
fact that they can feel pain in particular, making them, “the kind
of being whose interests should factor into our decision-making.” It sounds, then, that there is a reason to consider animals’
pleasure and pain into our moral decision-making, for morality
is more than mere obligation.
I don’t wish to defend any particular view of normative theory. Nor do I have anything in particular to say about the distinction between obligation and supererogation, save that, from the
perspective of wanting to be a good person, the difference between what we are morally required to do and what it would be
good for us to do is not the only or primary question. We may
wish to do, and certainly may do, what is best even if we are
not obligated to do so. As individual, this might not amount to
much of a concern, but we can imagine a group of individuals
working together to prevent predation and otherwise redesign
nature into a happier place. Such a Supererogation Squad is
not acting out of duty, but because they want to do what’s best.
They “try to make [animals’] lives better, in whatever ways
[they] can, including preventing the existence of animals that,
overall, will make the lives of other animals worse.”
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My aim in raising this supererogation problem is not to
ridicule contextualism or consequentialism as general moral
views. Recall that I began this point by discussing Palmer’s
wild animal version of the demandingness objection to utilitarianism. That objection is supposed to be levied at the normative
principle of value maximization in utilitarianism. I then tried to
show that if we accept hedonism as the theory of value, then the
contextualist view of obligation allows (but does not require)
the very same interventions. So, if it is considered problematic that the utilitarian view demands such interventions, then
it should also be considered problematic that the contextualist view allows such interventions. As an aside, note that the
supererogation problem occurs for nonmaximizing consequentialisms too. For example, satisficing (Slote 1984) and progressive (Jamieson and Elliot 2009) consequentialisms both try to
reduce the demandingness of the deontic principle of value
maximization, but they nonetheless permit that we go above
and beyond the call of duty.
If my analysis here analysis is on track, then the real issue
is not the deontic principle at play—contextualist, value maximizing, or what have you—but the conception of value informing such a principle. It is not that utilitarianism demands too
much, but rather, it demands the wrong things. Similarly, it is
not that the version of the contextualist view under consideration demands too much nor that it demands too little, but rather, it allows the wrong things. I have tried to show that, if we
leave hedonism in place on either view of obligation, we still
seem to get an objectionable result from the theory: widespread
intervention into the lives of wild animals. On the rough seas
of morality, if we end up where we never wanted to be, perhaps
the navigational tool is to blame.
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It bears mentioning that Palmer endorses such a subjectivist view of value in Animal Ethics in Context (Palmer 2010,
9-24). In this more recent paper currently under consideration,
she claims that the contextual view holds that “factors other
than capacities and their expression may be of direct moral significance.” So, the supererogation problem perhaps has traction
against Palmer’s view in Animal Ethics in Context more so than
the more recent paper, if there turn out to be additional factors
other than animals’ capacities to experience pleasure and pain
of direct moral significance on the view, and if they point in
different directions than the hedonistic view. It is also worth
pointing out that concerns about utilitarianism arise from it’s
hedonistic view of value and not its principle of value maximization. It remains to be seen whether versions of consequentialism more subtle than utilitarianism avoid Palmer’s reservations
about wild animals. Such consequentialisms may be demanding, but they just might demand the right things.
The elephant in the room is the potential role of conceptions
of well-being other or more than a subjective, hedonistic view,
and perhaps the role of environmental values which have nothing to do with well-being as well. Palmer claims that the contextualist view will “coincide to some extent with a wildnesspreserving environmental ethics.” If the supererogation problem is as serious as I have suggested, it seems that a contextual
view only coincides with a wildness-preserving environmental
ethics if we satisfy the moral minimum or reject hedonism. I
hold out the hope that a wildness-preserving ethic turns out to
be both an animal ethic and an environmental ethic.
Furthermore, Palmer wishes to table the question of environmental value and focus solely on our obligations to animals.
However, it’s not clear that we can or should separate the two
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for wild animals. That is, we might get an answer for how we
ought to act towards wild animals qua animals, but this may
turn out to be altogether different than how we ought to act in
cases involving wild animals, all things considered.
I argued above in section 2 that wildness connotes certain
capacities conducive to survival and reproduction that domesticated animals lack, and that this conception of wildness
is a way of understanding why our obligations towards wild
animals differ from our obligations to domesticated animals.
However, the value of wildness may turn out to be more than
merely instrumentally valuable to the production of subjective
well-being. The 20th century American naturalist Edwin Way
Teale writes: “Those who wish to pet and baby wild animals
‘love’ them. But those who respect their natures and wish to
let them live normal lives, love them more” (Teale 1987, 71).
Teale’s suggestion is that letting animals be respects their value
more than the alternative, coddling sentimentalist view. Perhaps what we owe wild animals in general is not, in a word,
happiness, but something more like liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. If there is something to this alternative conception
of the value of wildness, then concerns about policing nature
are cut off much earlier.

4. Conclusion: A Tale of Two Metaphors
I’d like to end on a cautionary note with a pair of metaphors:
Prometheus and Icarus. The idea that we should remake nature
in a humanist image strikes me as rather Promethean. It’s as if
we have the technology of the gods and perfect moral knowledge, and so we ought to reach “down” as champions of critterkind and rewrite nature in our image. However, a moral view
which closes off possibilities for the future through the rewriting of nature and super-killing of entire species (Rolston 1995),
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should give us pause. In our attempts to reach this supposed
moral high ground, we pass many warning signs, acting with
the hubris that we have the correct conception of value and that
we may or ought to control everything. Perhaps we are more
like Icarus, flying ever faster into the blinding white sunlight.
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